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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2771 
____________          
                                       
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JON J. LACKNER 
                          Appellant 
___________                       
 
    On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00813-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 30, 2013 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and COWEN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: August 14, 2013 ) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
At issue on this appeal is the validity of a search of a laptop computer undertaken 
by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to search warrants issued by 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania authorities.  The District Court denied Appellant Jon 
Lackner’s motion to suppress the inculpatory evidence revealed by the search, concluding 
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that the FBI agents acted within the  scope of the validly-issued warrants and that, in any 
event, they relied in good faith on the warrants, precluding suppression of evidence as a 
remedy.  We agree with the District Court’s analysis.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  
I. 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
In the Fall of 2008, Lackner, a resident of Cherry Hill, New Jersey, was the 
subject of an investigation undertaken by the Police Department of Bensalem, 
Pennsylvania as a result of internet communications between Lackner and a fictitious 
fourteen year-old girl named “Jessica.”  The internet communications were sexual in 
nature and graphic, and included a live video transmission of Lackner masturbating while 
communicating with “Jessica.”  When Lackner traveled to Bensalem on March 24, 2009 
for the purpose of having sex with “Jessica,” he was arrested by Bensalem law 
enforcement officers.   
Using the information gathered by the Bensalem authorities, Cherry Hill, New 
Jersey police officers procured a warrant to search Lackner’s residence.  The affidavit 
submitted in support of the search warrant application concluded that there was probable 
cause to believe that computers and other electronic devices, such as cameras and disks, 
constituted evidence of the crime of Endangering the Welfare of a Child, in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4.  The affidavit explained that the electronic devices would have 
to be searched by an analyst, and requested permission to turn these items over to 
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Bensalem Police for further search.  The New Jersey warrant explicitly permitted “any 
officer of any police department having jurisdiction” to search Lackner’s residence for 
computers and other electronic devices for “evidence of the crime of Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child.”  (App. 41).   
Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of three computers (a Sony laptop, 
a Toshiba laptop, and a Dell desktop), three web cameras, and two flash drives.  In 
addition, Lackner’s employer, Main Street Dental, gave police a desktop computer used 
by Lackner.  All of the seized items were turned over to the Bensalem Police, which 
subsequently turned over the computers and other electronic evidence to the 
Pennsylvania State Police Computer Crime Lab.   
Bensalem Police then applied for a second warrant, seeking permission to search 
“the items seized from Jon Lackner . . . and Main Street Dental . . . which are currently 
housed at Bensalem Township Police Headquarters.”  (Supp. App. 1.)  The affidavit 
accompanying the warrant application listed nine electronic devices to be searched.  The 
computers seized from Lackner’s house and the Main Street Dental computer were the 
last four items listed.  The affidavit sought permission to search the nine devices “for 
images and/or data that involve the application or documentation of Unlawful Contact 
with a Minor and Criminal Use of a Communications Facility including but not limited to 
instant messaging archives, buddy lists, photographs, phone books/logs, text messages, 
emails, and documents relating to residency and computer ownership.”  (Supp. App. 8).  
Twice in its concluding paragraph the affidavit listed the nine devices in the same order.   
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The accompanying warrant issued by a Pennsylvania judicial officer described the 
“premises or persons” to be searched as the items taken from Lackner’s home and Main 
Street Dental, but the list of items to be searched omitted the last three devices identified 
in the concluding paragraph of the affidavit, including the Sony laptop.  Although only 
six devices were specifically listed on the section of the warrant specifying the items to 
be searched, the Pennsylvania State Police examiner proceeded to search all nine devices 
identified in the affidavit accompanying the warrant application, including the Sony 
laptop.  This initial search indicated that the Sony laptop did not contain evidence relating 
to “Jessica.”   
In December of 2009, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
returned a five-count indictment, charging Lackner with federal offenses arising out of 
his interaction with “Jessica.”  In October of 2010, shortly before trial was scheduled to 
commence, Lackner’s counsel claimed that discovery was incomplete, and requested a 
mirror image of the Sony laptop’s hard drive.  The government acceded to this request, 
but only after the FBI conducted a forensic examination of the laptop. 
During this examination, the FBI found a video of a 16 year-old girl exposing 
herself to Lackner, along with chat logs documenting Lackner’s directions to the girl 
while he watched and recorded her on his computer.  In light of this development, a 
federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment that added one count charging 
Lackner with using a minor to produce visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and one count charging Lackner with possession of 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §  2252(a)(4). 
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Before trial on the superseding indictment began, Lackner moved to suppress the 
evidence found on the Sony laptop.  The District Court denied the Motion to Suppress on 
three grounds: (1) the search was authorized under the terms of the New Jersey warrant; 
(2) the search was valid under the Pennsylvania warrant because the Sony laptop had 
been omitted from the list of items to be searched as the result of a “clerical error,” and 
(3) the FBI had acted in good faith in believing that the Pennsylvania warrant authorized 
the search of the Sony laptop.  After the motion to suppress was denied, Lackner 
successfully moved to sever the two additional counts of the superseding indictment and 
proceeded to trial on the original five counts.  After a seven day jury trial, Lackner was 
convicted on all five counts.   
Lackner subsequently pled guilty to the two counts added by the superseding 
indictment.  As part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that Lackner would 
retain his right to appeal the District Court’s decision on the Motion to Suppress.   
The District Court sentenced Lackner to 120 months’ imprisonment on counts one 
through five, and seven, and 180 months on count six, which charged Lackner with the 
use of a minor to produce visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct.  All sentences 
were to be served concurrently.  The District Court also imposed a five-year term of 
supervised release, a fine of $1,500, and a special assessment of $700.   Lackner filed this 
timely appeal, limited to the District Court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress the 
evidence seized from the Sony laptop.   
II. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress “for clear error as to the underlying factual findings,” but “exercise[] plenary 
review of the application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 
336 (3d Cir. 2002).  We must sustain the District Court’s ruling if the search was 
authorized by either the New Jersey or the Pennsylvania warrant.  Even if neither warrant 
authorized the search of the Sony laptop, we must uphold the denial of the suppression 
motion if the FBI agents relied in good faith on the existence of an otherwise invalid 
warrant. 
A.  The New Jersey Search Warrant 
 Lackner does not contend that the New Jersey warrant was infirm, that the search 
of his residence was unconstitutional, or that the seizure of the Sony laptop was 
inappropriate.  Instead, Lackner’s argument is confined to the legality of the search of the 
laptop’s contents.    
 Lackner first asserts that the New Jersey warrant’s explicit authorization for the 
search to be conducted by “any officer of any police department having jurisdiction” 
should be understood as limited to only those law enforcement officers “having 
jurisdiction to execute this warrant.”  (Lackner Reply brief at 1.)  Lackner elaborates that 
only a law enforcement officer “having adequate territorial or exceptional jurisdiction to 
execute” the warrant, (id. at 3), was authorized to conduct a search under the New Jersey 
warrant.  Lackner, however, does not cite any authority for the proposition that he has 
standing to challenge who has the authority to execute a validly-issued warrant.  In this 
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regard, it is not unusual for local law enforcement personnel to rely upon the expertise of 
federal forensic examiners to undertake the highly technical examination of electronic 
media.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding 
under plain view doctrine FBI search of computer pursuant to a state court warrant issued 
to state law enforcement personnel).  Indeed, the warrant in this case contemplated that 
the Cherry Hill police officers would deliver the seized items to law enforcement officers 
outside their territorial jurisdiction. 
 Lackner argues, however, that the New Jersey warrant authorized only the seizure 
of the Sony laptop and other electronic media, not a search of their contents.  This 
argument is specious.  The warrant allowed for a search of Lackner’s residence for 
evidence of “the crime of Endangering the Welfare of a Child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 
2C:24-4.”  (App. 43.)  Only by examining the contents of electronic media could it be 
ascertained that evidence of such criminal activity existed.  In this respect, the affidavit 
accompanying the search warrant application attested to the needs of an analyst to 
conduct a proper examination of the contents of the electronic media.  Thus, the New 
Jersey warrant plainly contemplated a search of the digital evidence. 
  Finally, contrary to Lackner’s assertion that the New Jersey warrant at best 
allowed for searching for evidence of Lackner’s contacts with “Jessica,” the warrant 
extended to evidence “relevant to any prosecution of the designated offense,”  Williams, 
592 F.3d at 520, i.e.,“Endangering the Welfare of a Child.”  The fact that the evidence 
found on the Sony laptop depicted a second potential minor does not invalidate the 
seizure or the search.     
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 In summary, the FBI agents were authorized to participate in the search, the search 
was properly confined to the limits of the search warrant, and the search warrant did not 
restrict the search to evidence involving “Jessica.”  Therefore, the District Court did not 
err in denying the motion to suppress on the basis of the New Jersey warrant.   
B.  The Pennsylvania Search Warrant 
 Although the Sony laptop was not included in the section of the Pennsylvania 
warrant listing the specific items to be searched, the District Court concluded that the 
search of its contents was valid because its omission from that list was an obvious clerical 
error.  We discern no error in the District Court’s conclusion. 
 In Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2004), we recognized that an 
ambiguity in the warrant or an evident clerical error in the warrant can be resolved by 
reference to the supporting affidavit, even where, as here, the affidavit has not been 
incorporated into the warrant.  We explained that “[i]n these situations, it is clear that the 
requesting officers and the magistrate agreed on the place to be searched or items to be 
seized, but there is an obvious ministerial error in misidentifying or ambiguously 
identifying the place or item.”  Id.  This is such a case. 
 The section of the warrant captioned,  “SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF 
PREMISES AND/OR PERSON TO BE SEARCHED,” states:  “Item[s] seized from Jon 
Lackner, 801 Cooper Landing Road, Apartment B604, Cherry Hill, NJ 08033 and Main 
Street Dental, 2581 E. Chestnut Avenue, Vineland, NJ 08361 which are currently being 
housed at Bensalem Police Headquarters.” (Supp. App. 1.)  The Sony laptop, of course, 
was one of those items.  But, the section of the warrant captioned “IDENTIFY ITEMS 
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TO BE SEARCH FOR AND SEIZED,” listed only six of the nine devices that were 
being held at Bensalem Police Headquarters.  There is thus an obvious ambiguity on the 
face of the warrant itself:  on the one hand, the warrant indicates that only six electronic 
devices are to be searched, but on the other hand, it indicates that all electronic devices in 
the possession of the Bensalem Police Department are to be examined.  
 This ambiguity is resolved and the existence of a clerical error is revealed by 
reference to the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application.  The 
three omitted items, including the Sony laptop, are the last items in the affidavit’s 
detailed description of the items sought to be searched.  The concluding paragraph of the 
affidavit twice lists the devices to be searched in the same order, with the Sony laptop 
being the seventh device identified.  The warrant repeats in haec verba only the first six 
items in the exact same order as set forth in the affidavit.  It is perfectly plain that the law 
enforcement officers sought permission to search all nine items, and that the issuing 
judicial authority had a plain understanding of what items were to be searched.  “Reliance 
on the affidavit in these circumstances neither broadens nor shrinks the scope of the 
warrant, but merely rectifies a ‘[m]inor irregularit[y].’”  Doe, 361 F.3d at 240 (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the Pennsylvania warrant 
authorized the search of the Sony laptop. 
  C.  The Good Faith Determination 
 The District Court also concluded that, even if the search of the Sony laptop was 
not authorized by either the New Jersey or the Pennsylvania warrants, suppression of the 
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evidence derived from the search was not required because the FBI had acted in good 
faith.  We agree. 
 The Fourth Amendment does not bar the use of evidence “obtained by officers 
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate.”  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).  Stated otherwise, 
suppression of evidence is “inappropriate when an officer executes a search in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a warrant’s authority.”  United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In determining whether the evidence 
should be excluded, the court must consider “whether a reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate judge’s 
authorization.”  Id. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 The District Court’s determination that the search was authorized under both the 
New Jersey and the Pennsylvania warrants supports the conclusion that the search in this 
case was undertaken in objectively reasonable reliance on the authority of the warrants.  
Indeed, the existence of a warrant typically suffices to supplant the need for a “deep 
inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Buttressing 
the conclusion that the federal agents acted in reasonable reliance upon the authority of 
the warrant is the fact that Pennsylvania law enforcement officers also inspected the Sony 
laptop.   
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 Lackner argues that the search could not have been conducted in good faith 
because the laptop was in the possession of law enforcement for two years prior to the 
federal search being conducted, and therefore the age of the warrants alone made reliance 
unreasonable.  This argument is meritless.  Items lawfully seized may be searched anew 
as long as the item remains in the legitimate, uninterrupted possession of the police.  See 
United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 1983).  Lackner presents no 
evidence that the police possession became unlawful during the two-year period, or that 
possession was interrupted at any point.   
 Lackner has thus failed to establish that the District Court erred in concluding that, 
even if the New Jersey or Pennsylvania warrants were fatally flawed, suppression of the 
evidence was appropriate.  Accordingly Lackner’s motion to suppress was properly 
denied.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
